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Suppressing Evidence in Immigration 
Proceedings: The Need for a Lenient 
Egregiousness Standard and Rebellious 
Lawyering 
Mikaela A. Devine* 
Werquely Jeanini Almeida-Amaral was walking with a 
couple of friends into a gas station parking lot in Texas when a 
border patrol agent stopped him for no reason.1 The agent used 
Almeida-Amaral’s Brazilian passport as the basis for filing a 
Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien form with an immi-
gration court.2 Consequently, the Immigration Judge (IJ) or-
dered Almeida-Amaral deported.3 On appeal, Almeida-Amaral 
disputed the IJ’s denial of his motion to suppress the evidence 
obtained during the stop.4 The Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit determined that, although the stop was a violation of 
Almeida-Amaral’s Fourth Amendment rights,5 the Fourth 
Amendment violation was not severe and egregious enough un-
der the prevailing Lopez-Mendoza standard,6 and the denial of 
Almeida-Amaral’s motion to suppress evidence was proper.7 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, 2015, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2012, 
Luther College. The author would like to thank the editors and staff members 
of the Minnesota Law Review, Professor Stephen Meili, and her family and 
friends—especially Nick Devine—for their support throughout this writing 
and editing process. Copyright © 2014 by Mikaela A. Devine. 
1. Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 236 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[T]he 
arresting agent in our case . . . had no valid reason or suspicion to justify his 
stop.”). 
 2. Id. at 232–33. 
 3. Id. at 233. 
 4. Id. 
 5. The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and sei-
zures. U.S CONST. amend. IV. 
 6. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984); see infra Part I.A (ex-
plaining the Lopez-Mendoza standard). 
 7. Almeida-Amaral, 461 F.3d at 236–37. 
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Because the Supreme Court has determined that immigra-
tion proceedings are “purely civil,”8 motions to suppress evi-
dence are generally not appropriate.9 The Supreme Court has 
identified three possible exceptions to this rule: (1) if Fourth 
Amendment violations are widespread, (2) if the violations are 
egregious and go beyond fundamental fairness, or (3) if the vio-
lations are egregious and undermine the validity of the evi-
dence obtained.10 However, some circuits’ interpretations of 
these exceptions still result in constitutional violations that are 
not remedied.11 
The Supreme Court itself recognized that it is important 
“to protect the Fourth Amendment rights of all persons,”12 in-
cluding undocumented immigrants. Nevertheless, the Court 
held that the main goal of the exclusionary rule13 was to deter 
misconduct by immigration officials, not to protect immigrants’ 
rights.14 The Court determined that since immigration proceed-
ings are civil, and there are already other measures in place to 
deter misconduct,15 the exclusionary rule would be pointless in 
immigration proceedings.16 However, immigration law increas-
ingly resembles criminal law, both in investigations and in 
court proceedings.17 Moreover, non-immigration officials, such 
as state and local law enforcement, now conduct immigration 
 
 8. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1038. 
 9. See id. at 1050–51 (“We hold that evidence derived from [peaceful ar-
rests by INS officers] need not be suppressed in an INS civil deportation hear-
ing.”). 
 10. Id. 
 11. See, e.g., Puc-Ruiz v. Holder, 629 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 2010); 
Melnitsenko v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2008); Westover v. Reno, 202 
F.3d 475 (1st Cir. 2000). 
 12. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1046. 
 13. The “exclusionary rule” refers to the protections of the Fourth 
Amendment, under which it is appropriate to suppress or exclude evidence 
that was obtained illegally, such as through a warrantless arrest. Id. at 1040–
41. 
 14. Id. at 1041 (citing United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976)). 
 15. Alternate measures to deter misconduct include deportation based up-
on other evidence not uncovered during the unlawful arrest and the INS’s dis-
ciplinary scheme for agents that violate constitutional rights. Id. at 1043–45. 
 16. Id. at 1046 (citing Janis, 428 U.S. at 458). 
 17. See generally Jennifer M. Chacón, A Diversion of Attention? Immigra-
tion Courts and the Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 
DUKE L.J. 1563 (2010); Stephen Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration 
Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 469 (2007); Allegra M. McLeod, The U.S. Criminal-Immigration Conver-
gence and Its Possible Undoing, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 105 (2012). 
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stops.18 Without proper remedies like suppression of evidence, 
local, state, and federal law enforcement officers stretch their 
authority too far,19 and immigrants pay the price for it—usually 
deportation.20 The solutions that others have offered to solve 
this problem, like overturning INS v. Lopez-Mendoza,21 using 
the “widespread violation” exception,22 and implementing sys-
temic changes23 are not practicable. 
This Note proposes a two-part solution to the growing issue 
of constitutional violations going unremedied in immigration 
proceedings. Part I of this Note introduces the development of 
the Lopez-Mendoza standard and how it limits the consequenc-
es officers face if they violate the Fourth Amendment. Part II 
discusses why immigrants need more protection in immigration 
proceedings and explains the limitations of proposed solutions. 
Part III argues that the practicable solution consists of two 
components—one at the attorney and client level, and the other 
at the judicial level. Specifically, this Note proposes that these 
constitutional violations can be solved if all federal circuits 
adopt the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of “egregious” pro-
pounded in Lopez-Rodriguez v. Mukasey,24 while urging immi-
gration attorneys to be “rebellious lawyers.”25  
I.  LOPEZ-MENDOZA AND THE CRIMINALIZATION OF 
IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS   
This Part describes the development and current state of 
immigration proceedings. Section A examines Lopez-Mendoza 
and the standard it developed to determine whether or not a 
motion to suppress evidence should be granted. Section B dis-
cusses the pervasiveness of Fourth Amendment violations in 
 
 18. See Chacón, supra note 17, at 1579–81. 
 19. See id. at 1606–11 (describing four ways in which law enforcement of-
ficials interpret their authority more broadly than the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act actually provides). 
 20. See generally cases cited supra note 11. 
 21. See generally Elizabeth A. Rossi, Revisiting INS v. Lopez-Mendoza: 
Why the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule Should Apply in Deportation 
Proceedings, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 477 (2013). 
 22. See Stella Burch Elias, “Good Reason To Believe”: Widespread Consti-
tutional Violations in the Course of Immigration Enforcement and the Case for 
Revisiting Lopez-Mendoza, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 1109 (2008). 
 23. See Chacón, supra note 17. 
 24. Lopez-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 25. See GERALD P. LÓPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO’S VI-
SION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE 38 (1992). See infra Part III for a more 
in-depth discussion of the concept of “rebellious lawyering.” 
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the immigration context and how the circuits interpret the 
Lopez-Mendoza standard. Section C explains how immigration 
proceedings have become increasingly criminalized over time. 
A. LOPEZ-MENDOZA: THE SEMINAL CASE REGARDING MOTIONS 
TO SUPPRESS IN IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS26 
Immigration and Nationalization Service (INS) agents ar-
rested Adan Lopez-Mendoza while he was at work at a trans-
mission repair shop in California.27 Although his boss told the 
INS agents that they could not question his employees during 
work hours, the agents entered the workplace anyway and 
spoke to Lopez-Mendoza.28 He gave his name and admitted that 
he was from Mexico; the INS agents placed him under arrest 
due to those admissions.29 
At Lopez-Mendoza’s individual hearing in front of an IJ, 
his counsel argued that Lopez-Mendoza was arrested illegally 
and therefore the proceedings should be terminated.30 Both the 
IJ and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) held that the 
“legality of the arrest was not relevant to the deportation pro-
ceeding” and thus found Lopez-Mendoza deportable.31 On ap-
peal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit remanded 
Lopez-Mendoza’s case, holding that the exclusionary rule ap-
plied in immigration proceedings.32 
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s holding.33 
The Court justified its holding in two ways: by finding that 
immigration proceedings are “purely civil” and therefore a form 
of relief for criminal proceedings is inappropriate, and by apply-
ing a balancing test as formulated in United States v. Janis.34 
For the first justification, the Court stated that immigration 
proceedings are “purely civil” since they only “determine eligi-
bility to remain in this country,” and that deportation is not a 
 
 26. Lopez-Mendoza is the first Supreme Court case responding to the use 
of the exclusionary rule in immigration proceedings and is still the seminal 
case as the Court has not yet revisited the issue. 468 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1984). It 
was controversial even in 1984, resulting in a 5–4 vote. See id. at 1033. 
 27. Id. at 1035. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 1035–36. 
 32. Id. at 1034. 
 33. Id. at 1051. 
 34. Id. at 1038, 1041; United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976). 
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punishment.35 In addition, IJs cannot adjudicate guilt, hearings 
can proceed in the absence of the respondent, and the INS usu-
ally only has to prove identity and alienage36 before the burden 
shifts to the respondent to show that he or she is not deporta-
ble.37 The Court found that these factors distinguished immi-
gration proceedings from criminal proceedings.38 
For the second justification, the Court explained that the 
purpose of suppressing evidence is “to deter future unlawful po-
lice conduct.”39 Janis established that the Court should weigh 
the benefit of deterring unlawful police conduct through sup-
pression of unlawfully obtained evidence with the cost of not 
being able to use that evidence in court.40 The Court deter-
mined that there were very few benefits because: (1) evidence of 
identity and alienage, the only matters the INS needs to prove, 
can usually be obtained through means independent of the un-
lawful arrest; (2) respondents hardly ever contest the lawful-
ness of their arrest; (3) the INS has its own deterrence scheme, 
including initial training on constitutional behavior, excluding 
unlawfully obtained evidence on its own, and punishing officers 
who violate the Fourth Amendment; and (4) there are alterna-
tive remedies like declaratory relief against the INS.41 
As for costs, the Court identified many.42 Allowing suppres-
sion of evidence would require IJs to “close their eyes to ongo-
ing violations of the law,” meaning they would have to release 
immigrants—criminals under our immigration laws—even 
when IJs know for a fact that the immigrants are violating the 
law.43 Furthermore, applying the exclusionary rule to immigra-
tion proceedings would complicate the immigration system.44 It 
would require IJs, immigration attorneys, and INS agents to 
understand the intricacies of the Fourth Amendment; it would 
delay immigration proceedings longer than necessary; and it 
would put a heavy burden on INS agents to write more detailed 
 
 35. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1038. 
 36. The burden to prove this is not “beyond a reasonable doubt” as in 
criminal proceedings; the burden is only “clear, unequivocal and convincing.” 
Id. at 1039 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 242.14(a) (1984)). 
 37. Id. at 1038–39. 
 38. Id. at 1039. 
 39. Id. at 1041 (quoting Janis, 428 U.S. at 446). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 1043–45. 
 42. See id. at 1046–49. 
 43. Id. at 1046–47. 
 44. Id. at 1048. 
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written reports for every one of the numerous arrests they 
make.45 Therefore, since few benefits and many costs would be 
gained from allowing suppression of evidence, the Court de-
clined to apply the exclusionary rule to immigration proceed-
ings.46 
However, in the final paragraph of its decision, the Su-
preme Court gave three possible exceptions to its holding.47 It 
stated that the exclusionary rule could apply if: (1) “Fourth 
Amendment violations by INS officers were widespread;” (2) 
the violations were egregious and thus “transgress[ed] notions 
of fundamental fairness;” or48 (3) the violations were egregious 
and thus “undermine[d] the probative value of the evidence ob-
tained.”49 Case law and legal scholarship regarding the exclu-
sionary rule after Lopez-Mendoza tend to focus on these three 
exceptions, with an emphasis on the interpretation of “egre-
gious.”50 
 
 45. Id. at 1048–49. 
 46. Id. at 1050. The dissenting opinions by Justices Brennan, White, Mar-
shall, and Stevens all argued that the exclusionary rule is not based on costs 
and benefits, nor does it serve the purpose of being a deterrent; instead, it 
arises from the Fourth Amendment itself. Id. at 1051–61. Nonetheless, the 
Supreme Court continues to use the Janis balancing test in a variety of cases 
regarding the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule. An example is 
Davis v. United States. 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011). In that case, the respondent 
was searched during a routine traffic stop. Id. at 2425. The officer found the 
respondent’s revolver during the stop, and the respondent filed a motion to 
suppress the revolver. Id. at 2425–26. Although Davis was a criminal case, the 
Supreme Court cited to Lopez-Mendoza and applied the balancing test from 
Janis. Id. at 2427. 
 47. Id. at 1050. 
 48. Although the language in the decision uses the conjunctive “and,” and 
not the disjunctive “or,” to link the three exceptions, see id., circuit courts and 
legal scholars have concluded that the Supreme Court’s reliance on Rochin v. 
California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), makes no sense if the conjunctive “and” is 
used. See, e.g., Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzalez, 461 F.3d 231, 234 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(finding that the use of “and” by the Supreme Court in Lopez-Mendoza was a 
mistake); Rossi, supra note 21, at 496–97. 
 49. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050. 
 50. See, e.g., Carcamo v. Holder, 713 F.3d 916 (8th Cir. 2013); Oliva-
Ramos v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 694 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2012); Eric W. Clarke, 
Lopez-Rodriguez v. Mukasey: The Ninth Circuit’s Expansion of the Exclusion-
ary Rule in Immigration Hearings Contradicts the Supreme Court’s Lopez-
Mendoza Decision, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 51 (2010); Jonathan L. Hafetz, Note, 
The Rule of Egregiousness: INS v. Lopez-Mendoza Reconsidered, 19 WHITTIER 
L. REV. 843 (1998). 
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B. FOURTH AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS AND HOW COURTS 
INTERPRET THE LOPEZ-MENDOZA RULE 
Fourth Amendment violations are commonplace in the 
immigration context.51 The Cardozo Immigration Justice Clinic 
conducted a study between the years of 2006 and 2008, esti-
mating that between fourteen and twenty-four percent of raids 
that occurred in New York and New Jersey were conducted 
without consent or warrants.52 Immigration home raids and 
work raids have consistently been covered on the news.53 Alt-
hough not every raid results in a Fourth Amendment viola-
tion,54 data suggests that attorneys are filing an increasing 
number of motions to suppress, especially in home raid cases, 
which correlates with the significant percentage of immigration 
raids that occur without a warrant or consent.55 The Lopez-
 
 51. See generally BESS CHIU ET AL., CARDOZO IMMIGRATION JUSTICE CLIN-
IC, CONSTITUTION ON ICE: A REPORT ON IMMIGRATION HOME RAID OPERA-
TIONS (2009), available at http://cw.routledge.com/textbooks/9780415996945/ 
human-rights/cardozo.pdf; Motions To Suppress in Removal Proceedings, LE-
GAL ACTION CTR., http://www.legalactioncenter.org/clearinghouse/litigation 
-issue-pages/enforcement-motions-suppress (last visited Sept. 14, 2014). 
 52. CHIU ET AL., supra note 51, at 10. 
 53. See generally 40 Arrested in Immigration Raid, NBC CONN., Mar. 1, 
2012, http://www.nbcconnecticut.com/news/local/40-Arrested-in-Immigration 
-Raid-141026783.html; Greg Botelho, ICE Agents Raid Arizona Car Wash 
Chain, CNN, Aug. 18, 2013, http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/17/justice/arizona 
-criminal-immigration-raid; Kacy Capobres, Immigration Agents Arrest More 
Than 3,100 in Largest Operation Ever, FOX NEWS LATINO, Apr. 2, 2012, 
http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2012/04/02/us-immigration-customs 
-enforcement-arrest-more-than-3100-in-nationwide; Spencer S. Hsu, Immigra-
tion Raid Jars a Small Town, WASH. POST, May 18, 2008, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/05/17/ 
AR2008051702474.html; Hundreds Arrested in Immigration Raids, CBS 
NEWS, Apr. 17, 2008, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/hundreds-arrested-in 
-immigration-raids. 
 54. See CHIU ET AL., supra note 51, at 10. 
 55. See id. at 13–14 (noting that between 2006 and 2009, there was a 
“nine-fold increase in the filing of suppression motions” and a “twenty-two-fold 
increase in suppression motions related to home raids”). The data was ob-
tained by looking at BIA decisions on Westlaw. Id. at 13 n.45. Because the Ex-
ecutive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) does not keep track of filed mo-
tions to suppress, this is the only available way to obtain data. Id. at 13. The 
Cardozo report does acknowledge that this data “significantly under-
represents the prevalence of suppression motions” because it does not include 
motions filed at the Immigration Court level. Id. Currently on Westlaw, there 
are eighty-four BIA decisions containing the term “motion to suppress” from 
2006 to the present. Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions, WestlawNext 
Database, https://1.next.westlaw.com (follow the “Administrative Decisions & 
Guidance” hyperlink; then follow the “Immigration” hyperlink; then follow the 
“Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions” hyperlink; then search “motion to 
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Mendoza standard is applied in these types of cases to attempt 
to remedy the illegal conduct through suppression of the evi-
dence obtained, but the circuits’ interpretations of the excep-
tions, specifically the “egregiousness” exception, vary widely.56  
The Ninth Circuit first explained the “egregiousness” 
standard in Adamson v. Commissioner in 1984, a few months 
after the Supreme Court decided Lopez-Mendoza.57 In explain-
ing Lopez-Mendoza and the “egregiousness” exception, the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated: “When evidence 
is obtained by deliberate violations of the [F]ourth 
[A]mendment, or by conduct a reasonable officer should know is 
in violation of the Constitution, the probative value of that evi-
dence cannot outweigh the need for a judicial sanction.”58 Thus, 
the Ninth Circuit has consistently held that an egregious viola-
tion has occurred when the officer either intentionally violates 
the Fourth Amendment, or if a reasonable officer should have 
known that his conduct violated the Fourth Amendment.59 
This standard was further elaborated on in Lopez-
Rodriguez v. Mukasey in 2008.60 In Lopez-Rodriguez, INS 
agents questioned the respondents, an aunt and her niece, in 
their home in California.61 According to the niece’s testimony, 
she partially opened her door when she saw that the INS 
agents were standing outside, but did not fully open the door or 
verbally indicate that they could enter.62 The INS agents then 
pushed the door open and entered her home, where they elicit-
 
suppress” between Jan. 1, 2006 and present) (last visited Jan. 21, 2014). This 
is an increase from the Cardozo report’s forty-eight motions filed from 2006 to 
2009. CHIU ET AL., supra note 51, at 13. However, considering that there are 
over 10,000 BIA decisions on Westlaw from 2006 to present, this is still not a 
significant number. Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions, supra (without 
searching “motion to suppress”). 
 56. See, e.g., Cotzojay v. Holder, 725 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2013) (fairly lenient 
egregiousness standard); Carcamo v. Holder, 713 F.3d 916 (8th Cir. 2013) 
(strict egregiousness standard); Adamson v. Comm’r, 745 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 
1984) (lenient egregiousness standard). 
 57. Adamson, 745 F.2d 541. Although this was a tax case, the Ninth Cir-
cuit has consistently applied the egregiousness standard to its immigration 
jurisprudence. See, e.g., Martinez-Medina v. Holder, 673 F.3d 1029 (9th Cir. 
2011); Lopez-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2008); Gonzalez-
Rivera v. INS, 22 F.3d 1441 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 58. Adamson, 745 F.2d at 545. 
 59. Id. See also Martinez-Medina, 673 F.3d 1029; Lopez-Rodriguez, 536 
F.3d 1012; Gonzalez-Rivera, 22 F.3d 1441. 
 60. Lopez-Rodriguez, 536 F.3d 1012. 
 61. Id. at 1014–15. 
 62. Id. 
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ed a sworn statement indicating that the niece was not legally 
present in the United States.63 Although the IJ found that there 
may have been a Fourth Amendment violation, it ordered 
Lopez-Rodriguez deported.64 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit reversed the BIA’s and the IJ’s decisions, and granted 
the motion to suppress the evidence obtained during that ques-
tioning because it found the Fourth Amendment violation to be 
egregious.65 In its explanation of the holding, the Ninth Circuit 
found it significant that the “unequivocal doctrinal backdrop” of 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in the Ninth Circuit showed 
that entrance into a home without a warrant or consent, even if 
the individual fails to object to such entry, is a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.66 Because of this, the Court held that “rea-
sonable officers would not have thought it lawful to push open 
the door to petitioners’ home simply because [the niece] did not 
‘tell them to leave or [that] she did not want to talk to them.’”67 
The Second Circuit has a similar standard. In Cotzojay v. 
Holder, another forced entry situation occurred.68 The respond-
ent, Sicajau, awoke to officers pounding on the windows and 
doors of his apartment building.69 Although another resident of 
the complex let the officers into the building, Sicajou left his 
door closed and locked.70 When the officers began pounding at 
his bedroom door, he opened it because he was afraid they 
would knock the door down.71 Sicajau gave no indication of 
permission to enter, but the officers entered the bedroom any-
way.72 They handcuffed him, questioned him, and searched his 
bedroom without a warrant or permission, uncovering evidence 
of his Guatemalan citizenship.73 The IJ held that although the 
officers’ conduct was “not courteous . . . and was disrespectful,” 
it did not amount to an egregious violation of Fourth Amend-
 
 63. Id. at 1015. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 1018. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980); United 
States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493 
(1958); United States v. Shaibu, 920 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 67. Lopez-Rodriguez, 536 F.3d at 1018. 
 68. Cotzojay v. Holder, 725 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 69. Id. at 174. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
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ment rights.74 The IJ explained that since Sicajau was not 
harmed or threatened with harm, there could be no egregious 
violation.75 The BIA affirmed the IJ’s order of deportation.76 The 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated this holding 
and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether 
there was in fact voluntary consent for officers to enter the 
home.77 In its analysis, the court reiterated its egregiousness 
standard: “[I]f record evidence establishe[s] either (a) that an 
egregious violation that was fundamentally unfair had oc-
curred, or (b) that the violation—regardless of its egregiousness 
or unfairness—undermined the reliability of the evidence in 
dispute,” then a motion to suppress evidence should be grant-
ed.78 When proceeding with this analysis, a court should con-
sider the “characteristics and severity” of the officer’s conduct 
and whether the conduct was based on a “grossly improper con-
sideration,” like race.79 While the Second Circuit, up to this 
point in time, had never found a violation to be “fundamentally 
unfair,”80 the Court of Appeals declined to require a showing of 
physical harm or threat of physical harm to reach the level of 
fundamental unfairness.81 This declaration allowed the Court to 
find an egregious violation in Sicajau’s case.82 The ruling ex-
panded the Second Circuit’s standard. It still does not rise to 
the leniency of the Ninth Circuit standard, but it comes close. 
In contrast, the Eighth Circuit has a stricter standard of 
egregiousness.83 In Carcamo v. Holder, essentially the same il-
legal entrance occurred as in the Ninth Circuit Lopez-
Rodriguez case.84 One of the respondents, Roberto Garcia 
Nuñez, opened the door to his trailer home slightly when he 
heard knocking on it.85 The Immigration and Customs En-
forcement (ICE) officers pushed into the home without consent 
 
 74. Id. at 176. 
 75. Id. at 177. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 184. 
 78. Id. at 180 (quoting Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzalez, 461 F.3d 231 (2d. 
Cir. 2006)). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 182. 
 82. Id. at 183. 
 83. See Carcamo v. Holder, 713 F.3d 916 (8th Cir. 2013). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 918–19. 
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or a warrant and uncovered evidence of illegal presence.86 The 
IJ ordered Nuñez deported, and the BIA affirmed.87 The Eighth 
Circuit also affirmed, using a “totality of the circumstances” 
test for egregiousness.88 This test is a discretionary, case-by-
case analysis that does not reference a specific list of conduct 
that is considered egregious.89 It stated that this Circuit has 
never held “that an unreasonable search becomes an egregious 
search merely because it invades the privacy of the home.”90 
The Eighth Circuit deliberately rejected the Ninth Circuit’s 
standard, which it labeled as a “bad faith” standard.91 
C. HOW IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS HAVE BECOME 
CRIMINALIZED SINCE LOPEZ-MENDOZA 
The Supreme Court in Lopez-Mendoza held that deporta-
tion proceedings are “purely civil.”92 However, past and current 
developments demonstrate that immigration proceedings may 
instead resemble criminal proceedings.93 Without the label of 
“criminal,” however, those caught up in the immigration sys-
tem are not given the types of safeguards normally found in 
criminal proceedings even though the consequences of immi-
gration violations can be more devastating than criminal sen-
tences.94 
Fairly recently, immigration has turned into a “zero-
tolerance policy.”95 Some of the biggest changes occurred in the 
1980s.96 Stephen Legomsky gives a helpful list of ways in which 
 
 86. Id. at 919. 
 87. Id. at 920. 
 88. Id. at 923. 
 89. Id. at 922–23. 
 90. Id. at 923. 
 91. Id. 
 92. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984). 
 93. See generally Legomsky, supra note 17 (arguing that immigration law 
has adopted harsh enforcement aspects of criminal law without adopting crim-
inal procedural protections). 
 94. For example, deportation and a permanent bar to reentry into the 
United States can be much more devastating than a one-month prison sen-
tence. 
 95. Daniel Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented: Ironic Bounda-
ries of the Post-September 11th “Pale of Law,” 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 
639, 642 (2004). 
 96. See, e.g., Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 
4181 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C., 15–16 U.S.C., 18 
U.S.C., 21–23 U.S.C., 26–29 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., 39 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., and 48 
U.S.C.) (increasing fines and sentence lengths for existing immigration-related 
offenses); Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 
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immigration proceedings have become part of this “zero-
tolerance policy.”97 First, immigration violations can now also 
be criminal offenses—there are certain crimes that are both vi-
olations of immigration law and criminal offenses, resulting in 
both immigration and criminal consequences.98 Examples in-
clude the crime of marrying solely to evade immigration laws 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1325(c) and the crime of making false state-
ments in order to obtain a passport under 18 U.S.C. § 1542.99 
Second, criminal convictions are increasingly dangerous for 
immigrants, as many have serious immigration consequenc-
es.100 For example, an undocumented person who has spent 
more than 180 days in a penal institution is barred from being 
considered a person of “good moral character,” a finding of 
which is required in order to apply for certain types of relief 
from removal.101 In addition, those with an “aggravated felony” 
are deportable.102 The definition of “aggravated felony” has ex-
panded dramatically.103 It went from only including “murder, 
weapons trafficking, and drug trafficking” to also including 
fraud, physical force, bribery, gambling, and obstruction of jus-
tice, among others.104 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996 also reduced the sentencing requirements 
for an “aggravated felony” determination.105 
Third, the same actors now enforce both immigration laws 
and criminal laws—state and local police enforce immigration 
laws, as well as immigration officials.106 Between 1978 and 
 
100 Stat. 3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) (crimi-
nalizing immigration-related offenses). Daniel Kanstroom argues that many of 
these past examples of criminalization of immigration law have increased sub-
stantially since the September 11 attacks. See generally Kanstroom, supra 
note 95. 
 97. Kanstroom, supra note 95; Legomsky, supra note 17, at 475–501. 
 98. Legomsky, supra note 17, at 476. 
 99. Id. at 477; see 8 U.S.C. § 1325(c) (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 1542 (2006); see 
also McLeod, supra note 17, at 118. 
 100. Legomsky, supra note 17, at 482. 
 101. 8 U.S.C § 1101(f)(7) (2012). 
 102. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). 
 103. Legomsky, supra note 17, at 484. 
 104. Id. at 484–85; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A). 
 105. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C., 
18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 22 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.); see also Legomsky, supra note 
17, at 484–85. 
 106. Legomsky, supra note 17, at 496; see also McLeod, supra note 17, at 
113 (“Immigration enforcement is regularly delegated to local and state crimi-
nal officers.”). 
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2002, the Department of Justice (DOJ) advised local police to 
“refrain from detaining any person not suspected of a crime, 
solely on the ground that they may be deportable aliens.”107 In 
2002, however, the Attorney General explicitly renounced this 
policy and “concluded that state and local criminal enforcement 
officials have the inherent authority to arrest those individuals 
whom they believe to be deportable.”108 
These trends conflict with the Supreme Court’s categoriza-
tion of deportation proceedings as civil.109 Furthermore, they 
contradict Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.110 Because of this, 
legal scholars have explored various solutions to the issue of 
immigrants’ Fourth Amendment right to be free from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures.111 These solutions, however, are 
inadequate. 
II.  PROFFERED SOLUTIONS ARE NEITHER 
PRACTICABLE NOR EFFECTIVE   
Overruling Lopez-Mendoza, securing procedural safe-
guards, and immigration reform are all lofty goals. Neverthe-
less, in terms of Fourth Amendment violations, they are nei-
ther practicable nor effective. This Part discusses legal 
scholars’ proposed solutions to the issue of Fourth Amendment 
violations in immigration proceedings as they relate to the 
availability of motions to suppress evidence. Section A explains 
why overruling Lopez-Mendoza is not necessary to remedy 
Fourth Amendment violations, and even if attempted, it would 
be difficult to accomplish. Section B describes how additional 
protections, like guaranteed counsel, training of officers, class 
actions, and declaratory and injunctive relief, are inadequate to 
remedy Fourth Amendment violations. Finally, Section C ar-
gues that administrative reform would be just as difficult as—
or even more difficult than—overturning Lopez-Mendoza, and 
therefore is not practicable. 
 
 107. Kanstroom, supra note 95, at 664 (quoting Press Release, Att’y Gen. 
Griffin Bell, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (June 23, 1978)). 
 108. Legomsky, supra note 17, at 497; see also Kanstroom, supra note 95, 
at 664–65. 
 109. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984). 
 110. See Rossi, supra note 21, at 482–83 (arguing that non-citizens are not 
given the same Fourth Amendment rights held by U.S. citizens). 
 111. See, e.g., Chacón, supra note 17; Elias, supra note 22; Hafetz, supra 
note 50; Rossi, supra note 21. 
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A. OVERRULING LOPEZ-MENDOZA IS NOT A PRACTICABLE 
SOLUTION 
Overruling Lopez-Mendoza seems like a simple solution 
that would result in a Supreme Court decision that eradicates 
the circuit split and makes the exclusionary rule determination 
much clearer. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court would need to 
overcome substantial hurdles to overrule Lopez-Mendoza, and 
this measure is unnecessary given the exceptions outlined in 
Lopez-Mendoza. 
1. Overruling Supreme Court Precedent Is Not Likely to 
Occur 
The Supreme Court overrules its precedents in very lim-
ited circumstances. It has held that “a decision to overrule 
should rest on some special reason over and above the belief 
that a prior case was wrongly decided.”112 The Court delineated 
four factors to consider in determining whether to overrule one 
of its precedents: (1) whether the decision is no longer practical; 
(2) whether there is substantial reliance on the decision; (3) 
whether new law has essentially eliminated the need for the 
decision; and (4) whether the facts have changed so much as to 
render the decision unjustified.113 The last consideration is the 
most relevant in the immigration context. Elizabeth Rossi, for 
example, argued that the facts surrounding motions to sup-
press, such as the increase in Fourth Amendment violations, 
render the Supreme Court’s decision in Lopez-Mendoza unjusti-
fied.114 Nevertheless, Courts heavily rely on Lopez-Mendoza to 
justify decisions to grant or deny motions to suppress.115 New 
law has not eliminated the need for Lopez-Mendoza, and courts’ 
frequent usage of the decision indicates that its use is still 
 
 112. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864 (1992). 
 113. Id. at 854–55; see also Kenji Yoshino, Can the Supreme Court Change 
Its Mind?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/05/ 
opinion/can-the-supreme-court-change-its-mind.html. 
 114. Rossi, supra note 21, at 535 (“The Supreme Court based its holding in 
INS v. Lopez-Mendoza on two assumptions that can no longer justify it. The 
first assumption was that deportation proceedings are purely civil in na-
ture. . . . The second assumption the Court made was that its holding would 
preserve the streamlined deportation process.”). 
 115. A Shepard’s report of INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984), 
indicates that every circuit except the D.C. Circuit and the Federal Circuit has 
cited to Lopez-Mendoza in at least twenty-six cases, and that Lopez-Mendoza 
has been used in an increasing number of cases from 1984 until 2014. 
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practical.116 Even if the Supreme Court looked past these three 
factors and only focused on the change in facts, the timeline for 
review could stretch into years.117 If we sit and wait for years, 
hoping that the Supreme Court will hear a motion to suppress 
case, Fourth Amendment violations will continue to occur with-
out remedy. This is unacceptable. 
In addition, the Supreme Court recently had the oppor-
tunity to reconsider Lopez-Mendoza, but chose instead to follow 
its precedent.118 In Davis v. United States, decided in 2011, the 
Supreme Court used Lopez-Mendoza to justify not applying the 
exclusionary rule, and held that “when the police conduct a 
search in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate 
precedent, the exclusionary rule does not apply.”119 Further-
more, if properly interpreted, Lopez-Mendoza does not need to 
be overturned at all, now or in the future. 
2. The Three Exceptions in Lopez-Mendoza Are Broad Enough 
To Allow Relief 
The Supreme Court in Lopez-Mendoza delineates three ex-
ceptions to its general rule: widespread violations, egregious vi-
olations that are fundamentally unfair, and egregious viola-
tions that undermine the value of the evidence.120 A broad 
interpretation of the “egregious” exceptions in Lopez-Mendoza 
can provide just as much relief as overturning the case. Even 
Rossi, writing in early 2013, argued that the Supreme Court 
should overturn Lopez-Mendoza, admitting that “incorporating 
[the exclusionary rule] into deportation proceedings would es-
sentially mean bringing all of the federal courts in line with the 
Ninth Circuit’s definition of the egregious violations stand-
ard.”121 The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation is the broadest 
among the circuits.122 In Lopez-Rodriguez v. Mukasey,123 the 
Ninth Circuit explained that “egregious” violations are those 
where “evidence is obtained by deliberate violations of the 
 
 116. Id. 
 117. See Supreme Court Procedure, SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog 
.com/reference/educational-resources/supreme-court-procedure (last visited 
Sept. 14, 2014) (discussing the numerous steps necessary before a case is 
heard by the Supreme Court). 
 118. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011). 
 119. Id. at 2434. 
 120. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050–51. 
 121. Rossi, supra note 21, at 533. 
 122. Id. at 517. 
 123. 536 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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[F]ourth [A]mendment, or by conduct a reasonable officer 
should [have known] is in violation of the Constitution.”124 
Furthermore, there is evidence that the first exception, 
widespread violations, may now be a valid way to bypass Lopez-
Mendoza’s general rule.125 Although respondents typically rely 
on the “egregious” exception when arguing for a motion to sup-
press,126 Fourth Amendment violations have also become geo-
graphically and institutionally widespread.127 This indicates 
that the first exception could also be used to obtain an order to 
suppress. 
The combination of the Supreme Court’s hesitancy to over-
rule precedent with the availability of the Lopez-Mendoza ex-
ceptions demonstrates that overruling Lopez-Mendoza is not a 
practicable or necessary remedy. Other solutions have been 
proposed, but they too are not adequate or essential. 
B. OTHER PROTECTIONS STILL DO NOT ADDRESS THE SPECIFIC 
ISSUE OF A REMEDY FOR FOURTH AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS 
Scholars have suggested various additional protections 
that undocumented individuals should be given in order to pro-
tect against Fourth Amendment violations; some also highlight 
the protections that undocumented individuals already have.128 
However, none of these “protections” actually addresses the 
specific issue of remedying Fourth Amendment violations in 
immigration proceedings. 
1. Guaranteed Counsel 
Some legal scholars suggest that undocumented individu-
als should be guaranteed counsel in deportation proceedings.129 
Guaranteed counsel could increase the number of motions to 
 
 124. Id. at 1018 (alteration in original) (quoting Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22 
F.3d 1441, 1449 (9th Cir. 1994)). For a discussion regarding the validity of 
Lopez-Rodriguez, see infra Part III.B. 
 125. See generally Elias, supra note 22 (arguing that constitutional viola-
tions by immigration officers have become widespread since Lopez-Mendoza). 
 126. Id. at 1125. 
 127. Id. at 1126–40 (explaining that violations occur across the United 
States and are occurring more frequently now that law enforcement officers 
have gotten involved with detaining undocumented individuals). 
 128. See, e.g., Chacón, supra note 17 (discussing the gap in constitutional 
protections between criminal and civil proceedings and suggesting immigra-
tion court reforms that could better protect undocumented individuals). 
 129. See, e.g., id. at 1629; Michael Kaufman, Note, Detention, Due Process, 
and the Right to Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 4 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 113 
(2008). 
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suppress that are filed, since a large percentage of individuals 
in immigration proceedings are unrepresented.130 Pro se re-
spondents are not likely to understand when a motion to sup-
press should be made.131 Even if counsel was guaranteed, how-
ever, it would do no good in most circuits since it would not 
necessarily correlate with more motions to suppress being 
granted. Guaranteed counsel would need to be accompanied by 
an alteration to the exclusionary rule standard itself, either 
through the overruling of Lopez-Mendoza or the adoption of a 
more lenient standard. 
Moreover, guaranteed counsel would have substantial det-
rimental effects on the immigration system due to its high 
cost.132 The system is slow and over-burdened even without 
guaranteed counsel—adding an expense of $53 to $111 million 
for government-provided counsel for all indigent noncitizens in 
removal proceedings133 will only slow it down further.  
2. Enforcement Officer Training 
In Lopez-Mendoza, the Supreme Court held that suppres-
sion of evidence in immigration proceedings was unnecessary 
because of the internal INS protections already in place, such 
as the extensive training that enforcement officers receive 
when beginning their job.134 Contrary to the Supreme Court’s 
assumption in Lopez-Mendoza, evidence indicates that author-
ized officials may not actually receive effective training, espe-
cially when it comes to Fourth Amendment violations.135  
 
 130. According to the Executive Office for Immigration Review’s Statistical 
Year Book, in 2012 only fifty-six percent of respondents in completed immigra-
tion proceedings were represented. EOIR, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2012 
STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK G1 Fig. 9 (2013), available at http://www. 
justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy12syb.pdf. However, this number has been increas-
ing over the past few years. Id. 
 131. Chacón, supra note 17, at 1629–30 (“[U]nrepresented immigrants are 
unlikely to be able to adequately address the complex legal issues that a sup-
pression motion requires.”). 
 132. See Kevin R. Johnson, An Immigration Gideon for Lawful Permanent 
Residents, 122 Yale L.J. 2394, 2413 (2013) (noting the substantial costs of 
providing representation for immigration proceedings). 
 133. Id. (citing ABA, ENSURING FAIRNESS AND DUE PROCESS IN IMMIGRA-
TION PROCEEDINGS 5–16 (2008)). 
 134. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1044–45 (1984). 
 135. See Chacón, supra note 17 (discussing state and local police involve-
ment in immigration enforcement and increasing allegations of constitutional 
violations in immigration enforcement efforts); Elias, supra note 22, at 1148–
50 (pointing to the failure of ICE officers to follow INS guidelines and ICE’s 
resultant assertion that it is no longer required to adhere to INS guidelines). 
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One explanation for this lack of training is the indistinct 
line between immigration officials and state and local law en-
forcement.136 Congress first expanded immigration authority to 
state and local law enforcement in 1996, but it continues to 
grow.137 Some immigration law enforcement programs did re-
quire training in order for state and local law enforcement offi-
cials to participate in immigration enforcement.138 However, 
there is evidence indicating that efforts to regulate and train 
state and local officials—and even immigration officials—are 
not functioning correctly, resulting in more constitutional viola-
tions.139 For some programs, like the Fugitive Operations 
Teams that target fugitive and criminal aliens, no training 
whatsoever is required.140 We cannot rely on the minimal or 
nonexistent training that officials receive. While some training 
is present, it is not enough to protect against Fourth Amend-
ment violations. 
3. Civil Suits Including Class Actions 
Another alternative to suppression of evidence suggested 
by the Supreme Court in Lopez-Mendoza is declaratory relief.141 
The Court pointed to INS v. Delgado as an example.142 In that 
case, four employees of a factory filed suit in district court seek-
 
 136. Chacón, supra note 17, at 1579–82. 
 137. Id. at 1580–81. 
 138. For example, 287(g) agreements under the Immigration and National-
ity Act § 287(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006), allowed certain state and local law 
enforcement officers to enforce federal immigration law provided that they 
undergo training. Chacón, supra note 17, at 1582–83. 
 139. After the September 11 attacks in 2001, data regarding undocument-
ed immigrants were added to criminal justice databases used by state and lo-
cal law enforcement officials. HANNAH GLADSTEIN ET AL., BLURRING THE 
LINES: A PROFILE OF STATE AND LOCAL POLICE ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRA-
TION LAW USING THE NATIONAL CRIME INFORMATION CENTER DATABASE 
2002–2004, at 5–7 (2005), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/ 
MPI_report_Blurring_the_Lines_120805.pdf. State and local law enforcement 
officials were given the authority to run people through the database and noti-
fy DHS if an immigration violation was noted in the database. Id. at 12. Ap-
proximately forty-two percent of those notifications came up false, where the 
individual was not an immigration violator. Id. at 3. The authors attribute this 
high percentage to the limited amount of training the officials received, and 
they expressed concern that the limited training is resulting in wrongful de-
tentions. Id. at 29; see also Elias, supra note 22, at 1148–50 (describing that 
the training of ICE and INS officials is also limited and is causing regulatory 
violations in addition to constitutional violations). 
 140. See Chacón, supra note 17, at 1588–90. 
 141. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1045 (1984). 
 142. Id. 
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ing declaratory and injunctive relief based on their challenge to 
the legality of the interrogation tactics INS officials used in a 
workplace raid.143  
Standing and jurisdiction were held to be proper, indicat-
ing that similar suits are possible for undocumented individu-
als. However, the Supreme Court ultimately reversed the 
judgment and denied relief because it found that the respond-
ents had not been “seized” for purposes of their Fourth 
Amendment claim.144 
Since Delgado in 1984, changes have been made to limit 
noncitizens’ rights to file civil lawsuits.145 For example, “the Il-
legal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996 enacted limitations to judicial review, and the REAL ID 
Act of 2005 requires administrative exhaustion and limits judi-
cial review for certain matters arising out of immigration pro-
ceedings.”146 In addition, during the Bush administration, it 
was argued that Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 242 
“prevents immigration respondents from bringing Bivens147 
claims for damages, and the Second Circuit found that it does 
not have jurisdiction to hear claims under the Torture Victim 
Protection Act by nonresident aliens who were mistreated by 
U.S. officials and removed to nations where they were subjected 
to torture.”148 Changes like these have limited the availability of 
class action filings.149 Thus, although it is theoretically possible 
for noncitizens to file civil suits either individually or as mem-
bers of a class, it has become more difficult. Because of the 
tightening restrictions on the ability to sue, this alternative 
 
 143. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 212–13 (1984). 
 144. Id. at 212, 220–21. 
 145. Chacón, supra note 17, at 1630. See generally Jill E. Family, Threats 
to the Future of the Immigration Class Action, 27 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 71 
(2008) (explaining current trends limiting the future use of immigration class 
actions). 
 146. Chacón, supra note 17, at 1630–31 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2006)). 
 147. A Bivens action is one in which a victim of a Fourth Amendment viola-
tion sues the violator for that alleged constitutional deprivation. This type of 
action was established in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 
U.S. 388 (1971). 
 148. Elias, supra note 22, at 1154. 
 149. Family identified three threats to immigrant class actions: “(1) a gen-
eral congressional unwillingness to restrict immigration judicial review; (2) 
the application of waivers of judicial review to immigration law; and (3) legis-
lative jurisdiction-stripping attacks more specific to the immigration class ac-
tion.” Family, supra note 145, at 74. 
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cannot be considered an adequate remedy for Fourth Amend-
ment violations. 
C. ADMINISTRATIVE OVERHAUL STILL DOES NOT ADDRESS 
FOURTH AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS, AS EVIDENCED BY THE 
CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL DEBATE ON IMMIGRATION 
 Comprehensive immigration reform is certainly desira-
ble.150 A House bill regarding reform to immigration law, H.R. 
15, is based on the Senate’s similar bill and addresses some 
procedural and administrative problems with the immigration 
system.151 H.R. 15 guarantees appointed counsel in immigration 
proceedings for unaccompanied children, incompetent individ-
uals,152 and those who are particularly vulnerable.153 It also pro-
vides for additional immigration judges to lessen their individ-
ual workloads,154 and requires an improvement to training that 
immigration judges receive.155 H.R. 15 mandates extensive 
training for immigration officials, including training about the 
constitutional rights of individuals.156 Furthermore, it gives fed-
eral courts jurisdiction over claims of constitutional violations 
outside of removal proceedings.157 Of course, these protections 
would be beneficial to the system as a whole, and should elimi-
nate some constitutional, procedural, and administrative is-
sues.158 However, nowhere in the bill are Fourth Amendment 
violations specifically addressed; there is no provision regard-
ing the suppression of illegally obtained evidence.159 In addition, 
the training of state and local law enforcement officials is not 
 
 150. See, e.g., Soraya Fata et al., Custody of Children in Mixed-Status Fam-
ilies: Preventing the Misunderstanding and Misuse of Immigration Status in 
State-Court Custody Proceedings, 47 FAM. L.Q. 191, 191 (2013) (“Since 2005, 
there has been a growing consensus about the need for comprehensive immi-
gration reform.”). 
 151. See Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Mod-
ernization Act, H.R. 15, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013). 
 152. Incompetent individuals are defined as those having a “serious mental 
disability” under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12102(1). Id. at 698. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 694. 
 155. Id. at 704. 
 156. Id. at 106. 
 157. Id. at 45. 
 158. See, e.g., Chacón, supra note 17, at 1629; Family, supra note 145, at 
74; Kaufman, supra note 129, at 114. 
 159. See Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Mod-
ernization Act, H.R. 15, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013). 
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mentioned, and neither are internal protections within the INS 
with regards to constitutional violations by officials.160 The 
problems of Fourth Amendment violations are neither prevent-
ed by H.R. 15, nor are they remedied by any provision. Thus, 
even if H.R. 15 eventually becomes law, it will do nothing to 
remedy Fourth Amendment violations. 
Throughout Part II, this Note argues that proposed solu-
tions are not sufficient to alleviate the harm of Fourth Amend-
ment violations. To be clear, this Note is not arguing that any 
one of these solutions should be ignored. To the contrary, adop-
tion of any of the above solutions would benefit immigration 
law. Rather, this Note argues that, alone and in the aggregate, 
none of these solutions are sufficient, as they do not directly 
and quickly address Fourth Amendment violations. More action 
is necessary. This Note proposes that the optimal solution is 
the national adoption of the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of 
the Lopez-Mendoza “egregiousness” exception, and while that 
change is pending, lawyers should act “rebelliously.”161 
III.  SOLUTION: ADOPT THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S 
INTERPRETATION OF “EGREGIOUSNESS” AND BE 
REBELLIOUS LAWYERS   
This Note suggests a two-part solution to the issue of 
Fourth Amendment violations in immigration proceedings. The 
primary solution is adoption of the Ninth Circuit’s “egregious-
ness” standard in every federal circuit, which is addressed in 
Section A. Section B addresses concerns about the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s standard, and Section C explains how and when the 
standard could potentially be adopted. Section C also recogniz-
es that adoption of the standard may be challenging due to the 
slow pace of case law and the reluctance of courts to change 
precedent. To respond to this challenge, Section D describes re-
bellious lawyering, a concurrent method to remedy Fourth 
Amendment violations that should be implemented at least un-
til the Ninth Circuit’s standard is adopted. 
A. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S INTERPRETATION OF “EGREGIOUS” 
The Ninth Circuit has continued to adhere to the interpre-
tation of “egregious” it made in 1984, in the case of Adamson v. 
Commissioner: “When evidence is obtained by deliberate viola-
 
 160. See id. 
 161. LÓPEZ, supra note 25, at 38. 
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tions of the [F]ourth [A]mendment, or by conduct a reasonable 
officer should know is in violation of the Constitution, the pro-
bative value of that evidence cannot outweigh the need for a 
judicial sanction.”162 In other words, the Ninth Circuit finds 
that an egregious violation has occurred when the officer either 
intentionally violates the Fourth Amendment, or if a reasona-
ble officer should have known that his conduct violated the 
Fourth Amendment.163 
The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation provides for effective re-
lief for Fourth Amendment violations without overruling Lopez-
Mendoza, which has proven to be a hefty task.164 The relief is 
sufficiently broad to cover most Fourth Amendment violations, 
but is limited to when the officer deliberately acted or should 
have known that his or her conduct was unconstitutional.165 
Even without comprehensive immigration reform or additional 
protections like guaranteed counsel and civil remedies, the 
adoption of this standard can alleviate the harms of Fourth 
Amendment violations. It manages to find a middle ground be-
tween fully applying the exclusionary rule to immigration pro-
ceedings (overruling Lopez-Mendoza) and only applying the 
rule in the most extreme cases (the approach of other circuits, 
such as the Eighth Circuit’s totality of the circumstances test), 
which should ease the minds of many skeptics. 
B. CONCERNS ABOUT THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S STANDARD 
One concern that legal scholars have about the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s standard is that it is an “excessively broad interpretation” 
of Lopez-Mendoza.166 Even Judge Bybee in his concurring opin-
ion to Lopez-Rodriguez167 voiced concern about this issue. Judge 
Bybee posited that the Ninth Circuit’s standard “might even 
 
 162. Adamson v. Comm’r, 745 F.2d 541, 545 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 163. See Lopez-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 1012, 1016 (9th Cir. 2008). 
For a more detailed description of the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation, see supra 
Part I.B. 
 164. See supra Part II.A. 
 165. See, e.g., Martinez-Medina v. Holder, 673 F.3d 1029, 1035 (9th Cir. 
2011) (holding that suppression of evidence was inappropriate because there 
was no unequivocal doctrinal backdrop; it was unclear that “an alien’s admis-
sion to being illegally present in the United States created probable cause to 
seize the alien for violating federal immigration law”). 
 166. See Clarke, supra note 50, at 51–52. 
 167. See Lopez-Rodriguez, 536 F.3d at 1019–20 (“Our case law appears des-
tined to import the exclusionary rule, with all of its attendant costs, back into 
immigration proceedings, after the Court has taken it out. At some point, we 
may wish to revisit our position.”). 
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include the unseemly conduct of the INS agents in Lopez-
Mendoza, which the Court held did not warrant applying the 
exclusionary rule . . . .”168 However, this is not necessarily true. 
The Ninth Circuit’s standard is dependent upon whether the 
history of the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is clear enough 
to indicate that a reasonable officer should have known the 
conduct was unconstitutional.169 In Lopez-Mendoza, one of the 
two respondents was denied relief for a reason unrelated to the 
Supreme Court’s ruling on motions to suppress.170 The other re-
spondent, Sandoval-Sanchez, objected to the evidence obtained 
in a workplace raid, which is directly related to the Supreme 
Court’s ruling.171 If Sandoval-Sanchez’s case came before the 
Ninth Circuit today, it is unlikely that the outcome—denial of 
suppression—would have changed, because it is not clear that 
the officials in that case knew or should have known they were 
violating the Constitution.172 The Supreme Court indicated that 
at the time Lopez-Mendoza was decided, the INS’s scheme for 
deterring Fourth Amendment violations consisted of regula-
tions, which “require that no one be detained without reasona-
ble suspicion of illegal alienage, and that no one be arrested un-
less there is an admission of illegal alienage or other strong 
evidence thereof.”173 The regulations as stated by the Supreme 
Court in Lopez-Mendoza say nothing about getting a warrant or 
consent before entering a workplace or a home.174 Therefore, the 
Ninth Circuit would likely hold that the immigration jurispru-
dence in effect at the time of Lopez-Mendoza (as evidenced by 
the INS regulations) was too ambiguous, and thus would hold 
that suppression of evidence was not warranted. 
Additionally, the Supreme Court itself used the same 
Lopez-Rodriguez “doctrinal backdrop”175 reasoning in Davis v. 
United States.176 In Davis, an officer searched the respondent 
during a routine traffic stop, during which the officer found the 
 
 168. Id. at 1020. 
 169. Id. at 1018–19. 
 170. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1040 (1984) (“Lopez-Mendoza 
objected only to the fact that he had been summoned to a deportation hearing 
following an unlawful arrest; he entered no objection to the evidence offered 
against him.”). 
 171. Id. at 1036–37. 
 172. See id. at 1044–45. 
 173. Id. at 1045. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Lopez-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 1012, 1018 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 176. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011). 
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respondent’s revolver.177 The respondent filed a motion to sup-
press the evidence of the revolver.178 Although this is a criminal 
case, the Supreme Court cites to Lopez-Mendoza and applies 
the same balancing test from Janis that it did in Lopez-
Mendoza.179 In using the balancing test—weighing costs of the 
exclusionary rule against the benefits of officer deterrence—the 
Supreme Court found it significant that the officers did not vio-
late the Fourth Amendment “deliberately, recklessly, or with 
gross negligence” and that their actions were in “strict compli-
ance with binding precedent.”180 This indicates that the “doctri-
nal backdrop”181 of the officers’ actions was clear in that their 
actions did not violate the Constitution. This same reasoning 
was applied in the Ninth Circuit in Lopez-Rodriguez v. 
Mukasey.182 Because both courts used the same reasoning, and 
would have come to the same conclusion, it is clear that the 
Ninth Circuit’s standard is, in fact, consistent with Lopez-
Mendoza and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the exclu-
sionary rule as it applies to motions to suppress in immigration 
proceedings.183 
The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the “egregiousness” 
standard is the ideal interpretation. Nevertheless, the problem 
of implementing the adoption of the Ninth Circuit’s standard 
needs to be addressed. 
C. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S STANDARD 
The Ninth Circuit’s standard could be adopted in two ways: 
through the Supreme Court or through each federal appeals 
court individually. At the Supreme Court level, the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s interpretation would not require overruling Lopez-
Mendoza, as was established in Section B of this Note. Howev-
er, it would require substantial effort by the Supreme Court to 
adopt a new interpretation of its own rule, and it would also re-
quire that the Supreme Court hear another motion to suppress 
case in the context of immigration proceedings. Although possi-
ble, it is not likely to be a quick and easy solution. 
 
 177. Id. at 2425. 
 178. Id. at 2426. 
 179. Id. at 2427; United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976). 
 180. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2428–29. 
 181. Lopez-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 1012, 1018 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 182. Id. 
 183. See supra notes 166–182 and accompanying text. 
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Adopting the standard through each federal appeals court 
would also be an unwieldy solution.184 It is clear that a uniform 
adoption of the Ninth Circuit’s standard would be incredibly 
difficult to achieve. For example, some circuits, like the Eighth 
Circuit,185 will find it challenging to adopt the Ninth Circuit’s 
standard without overruling their own precedent. Other cir-
cuits, such as the Second Circuit,186 may find it easier because 
they do not have well-defined standards or the Ninth Circuit’s 
standard is consistent with their own. 
Although difficult, adoption of the Ninth Circuit’s interpre-
tation is still the ideal solution and should be pursued through 
rigorous appeals of motion-to-suppress denials in all circuits. 
However, because the adoption process may be lengthy, this 
Note proposes a concurrent solution to implement while the 
adoption of the standard is being sought. Rebellious lawyer-
ing187 may not force the immediate adoption of the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s standard, but it encourages action at the attorney and 
client level, and can initiate change regarding motions to sup-
press in immigration proceedings. 
D. CONCURRENT SOLUTION: REBELLIOUS LAWYERING 
This Note proposes that rebellious lawyering, a concept 
coined by Gerald López,188 is the concurrent solution to initiate 
the nationwide adoption of the Ninth Circuit’s standard. Rebel-
lious lawyering differs from traditional and formal advocacy in 
that it intimately involves clients in every step of the represen-
tation, and encourages them to problem solve through self-help 
measures and community organizing.189 A review of López’s 
book explained rebellious lawyering as follows: 
  López’s rebellious lawyers . . . are deeply rooted in the communi-
ties in which they live and work. They collaborate with other service 
agencies and with the clients themselves; they try to educate mem-
bers of the community about their rights; they explore the possibili-
ties of change and continually reexamine their own work in order to 
help their clients best. Rebellious lawyering thus redefines the law-
yer-client relationship as a cooperative partnership in which 
 
 184. This Note will not attempt to analyze the likelihood of each circuit 
adopting the Ninth Circuit’s standard. 
 185. See Martinez Carcamo v. Holder, 713 F.3d 916, 923 (8th Cir. 2013) 
(deliberately rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s standard). 
 186. See Cotzojay v. Holder, 725 F.3d 172, 176 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 187. LÓPEZ, supra note 25. 
 188. Id. 
 189. See Angelo N. Ancheta, Community Lawyering, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 
1363, 1368–69 (1993) (reviewing LÓPEZ, supra note 25). 
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knowledge and power are shared, rejecting a relationship limited to 
an active professional working on behalf of the passive, relatively 
powerless layperson.190 
Significantly, rebellious lawyers “focus on individual client 
representation” and not on institutional reform and impact 
work; its goal is to empower clients and others in similar situa-
tions, and to allow them to control the situation.191 
While López crafted this ideal of rebellious lawyering over 
twenty years ago, scholars continue to utilize the concept to 
support arguments for community and collaborative lawyer-
ing.192 In the phrase “rebellious lawyering,” López managed to 
artfully combine client-centered representation193 and commu-
nity lawyering, two nontraditional lawyering tactics. These two 
tactics—as embodied in the phrase “rebellious lawyering”—can 
be put to great use in the immigration context. Rebellious law-
yering provides a concrete method to begin to change motions 
to suppress in immigration proceedings, and to adopt the Ninth 
Circuit’s standard. It supports the argument that lawyers 
should not focus solely on systemic reform, like adopting the 
Ninth Circuit’s standard, because it does not focus on individu-
al clients or community-based change. Of course, the court sys-
tem does have to be involved, but it is not the only method by 
which to initiate change.194 Instead, lawyers can implement 
change at the client level in two main ways: community educa-
tion and client-driven representation and education.  
 
 190. Id. at 1370. 
 191. Id. at 1371. 
 192. See, e.g., Robin S. Golden, Collaborative as Client: Lawyering for Effec-
tive Change, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 393, 406 (2011–2012) (using López’s de-
scriptions of rebellious lawyering to advocate for thinking about the collabora-
tive—the community—as one’s client); Kelly McAnnany & Aditi Kothekar 
Shah, With Their Own Hands: A Community Lawyering Approach To Improv-
ing Law Enforcement Practices in the Deaf Community, 45 VAL. U. L. REV. 875, 
896 (2011) (calling López “a renowned pioneer of the community lawyering 
model” and discussing the use of a community lawyering model to remedy 
problems arising from deaf persons’ interactions with law enforcement offi-
cials). 
 193. See, e.g., Robin Steinberg, Heeding Gideon’s Call in the Twenty-First 
Century: Holistic Defense and the New Public Defense Paradigm, 70 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 961, 962 (2013) (defining the concept of client-centered represen-
tation as attorneys striving to “put clients’ lives, not just their cases, first”). 
 194. Ancheta, supra note 189, at 1368 (“Certainly, much work arises out of 
necessity: lawyers cannot escape the government’s monopoly over fields such 
as . . . immigration law . . . . The trap of regnant lawyering is failing to under-
stand that nontraditional alternatives such as self-help and community organ-
izing do exist and that the customary roles of attorney and client are not 
etched into stone.”). 
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1. Community Education 
Lawyers should spend time creating ways in which they 
can inform communities where undocumented immigration is 
prevalent about their Fourth Amendment rights. This is an im-
portant step in enacting change in Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence. Noncitizens should be aware of their Fourth 
Amendment rights and their ability to file motions to suppress 
if those rights are violated. Then, even if they are part of the 
approximately 44% of unrepresented immigrants in removal 
proceedings,195 they will have the opportunity to file motions to 
suppress. The more motions that are filed in immigration court, 
the more chances the appeals courts will have to reconsider 
their own standards. 
An example of community education is “Know Your Rights” 
programs.196 These types of programs can include information 
regarding eligibility for immigration benefits, procedures for 
acquiring immigration benefits, services available to immi-
grants, and constitutional rights such as the right to not be un-
reasonably searched.197 The programs at the Immigrant Legal 
Resource Center in California even include the distribution of 
“Red Cards.”198 On one side, the Red Cards give instructions in 
Spanish about how to exercise one’s constitutional rights.199 On 
the other side is a statement of an immigrant’s rights in Eng-
lish, intended to be given to an immigration enforcement officer 
if the officer attempts to speak with or enter the home of an 
immigrant without the appropriate warrant or consent.200 
Community education does not have to be difficult or com-
plicated. One group of people can implement community educa-
tion through a full-time commitment,201 or many groups can 
implement this solution to spread out the commitment and 
 
 195. See EOIR, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 130 (indicating that 56% 
of immigrants in removal proceedings in 2012 were represented in those pro-
ceedings). 
 196. See, e.g., Bill Ong Hing, Legal Services Support Centers and Rebellious 
Advocacy: A Case Study of the Immigrant Legal Resource Center, 28 WASH. U. 
J.L. & POL’Y 265, 282–85 (2008) (examining the “Know Your Rights” programs 
at the Immigrant Legal Resource Center as a form of community education). 
 197. Id. at 282–83. 
 198. Know Your Rights, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER, http://www. 
ilrc.org/for-immigrants-para-inmigrantes/know-your-rights (last visited Sept. 
14, 2014). 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Hing, supra note 196, at 282 (mentioning that attorneys at the Immi-
grant Legal Resource Center do the presentations themselves). 
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workload, like the New York City Know Your Rights Pro-
gram.202 This program functions with the help of “the City Bar 
Justice Center, the Legal Aid Society, the New York Chapter of 
the American Immigration Lawyers Association, private law 
firms, and several law school clinics.”203 The latter option fits 
more cleanly into rebellious lawyering, since it promotes in-
volvement with a community education program, yet still al-
lows for a concurrent position as a legal representative for im-
migrant clients. This is where attorneys can utilize client-
driven representation—in addition to community education—to 
inform clients on a one-to-one basis of their Fourth Amendment 
rights, and to diligently file motions to suppress evidence. 
2. Client-Driven Representation and Education 
Client-driven representation and education are also neces-
sary in rebellious lawyering. Lawyers should inform their po-
tential clients of all possible avenues of redress, including self-
help. Even if a noncitizen cannot afford legal representation, 
they deserve to understand their rights, and attorneys can help 
with this by teaching potential clients about the Fourth 
Amendment.204 
If an individual enters into a representation agreement 
with the lawyer, the lawyer should fully engage the client in 
deciding whether or not to file a motion to suppress. Motions to 
suppress should be suggested often, if relevant to the client’s 
case, even in jurisdictions with strict “egregiousness” stand-
ards. When filing motions to suppress, lawyers should push the 
court to recognize the Ninth Circuit’s lenient standard. 
Rebellious lawyering empowers clients more than tradi-
tional lawyering, giving them control of their situation, educa-
tion to better make decisions, and hope for alternative solu-
tions. They are better able to see change as it applies to their 
case. It may not fix the immigration system, but, at the very 
least, it is kick-starting the change necessary in Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, while attorneys diligently file mo-
tions to suppress, appeal the denials, and push for the adoption 
of the Ninth Circuit’s “egregiousness” standard.  
 
 202. Denny Chin, Representation of the Immigrant Poor: Upstate New York, 
33 CARDOZO L. REV. 351, 355 n.28 (2011). 
 203. Id. 
 204. Rebellious lawyering encourages “teaching” over “talking about” the 
law. See Ancheta, supra note 189, at 1369. 
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  CONCLUSION   
Imagine sitting in your living room and hearing a knock on 
the door. Before getting up to answer it, ICE agents are inside 
your home, demanding to see your identification without show-
ing you a warrant or telling you who they are.205 Then imagine 
not being able to seek redress for this obvious Fourth Amend-
ment violation. Is this constitutional? 
It is clear that Fourth Amendment violations are still 
prevalent and require a remedy, especially in immigration pro-
ceedings. Motions to suppress evidence can be an effective and 
sufficient method to remedy constitutional wrongs, yet they are 
not regularly used in immigration proceedings. Solutions pro-
posed by other scholars, such as guaranteed counsel, overruling 
Lopez-Mendoza, and broad immigration reform are neither 
practicable nor necessary. In order to reduce Fourth Amend-
ment violations and provide redress, this Note proposes a two-
part solution: nationwide adoption of the Ninth Circuit’s stand-
ard for the Lopez-Mendoza “egregiousness” exception, while 
concurrently being rebellious lawyers to initiate change at the 
client and attorney level. Not only will this solution lead to an 
eventual binding interpretation to provide an effective remedy 
to Fourth Amendment violations, but it will also empower cli-
ents with the education and control needed to alter their cir-




 205. CHIU ET AL., supra note 51, at 17 (describing how this happened in 
Texas in 2008 to a sixty-eight-year-old woman who had been a citizen for forty 
years). 
